The International Economic Law Revolution by Trachtman, Joel P.
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
REVOLUTION
JOEL P. TRAcHTMAN*
1. INTRODUCTION
With the change in name of this journal, the Law School of
the University of Pennsylvania might appear to some to be taking
a step backward, away from business. This step might appear
strange at a time when the world seems to have come to a
consensus that business - economic organization in the form of
the market or the firm - should be central to economic organiza-
tion. The central position of business should not be confused
with an exclusive position, however. As economic organization
includes more than business, this change in name really is a step
toward a broader field rather than a step away from business.
More importantly, it is a step toward a more nuanced perspective
on international law and toward a more mature perspective on the
role of business in domestic and international society. It is a step
toward recognizing that there are markets beyond the private
market for goods and services, and that these additional markets
and accompanying institutions merit closer study. These other
relevant markets include the market among governments for trade
and regulatory concessions. Institutions beyond the firm and the
state also merit closer study.
I begin this essay with an examination of four associated fields
of legal study: private international law, international business
law, international economic law, and public international law. I
make four related arguments. While none of these points is
wholly novel, my goal is to show their common underpinnings
and their interrelation as the foundation for a new, cosmopolitan
perspective which may be used to understand and manage the
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international economic law revolution. These first four points are
simply intended to establish the broad parameters of international
economic law. After I have established these parameters, I turn
to the question of the importance of international economic law,
and of its relation to other areas of economic regulation. I then
describe the role of international economic law as a central forum
for mediating between national and international and public and
private law.
First, I observe that economics includes, and dominates,
business. Therefore, as noted above, the change in name of this
journal is quite appropriate, as international economic law
encompasses international business law, including relevant
portions of the topic known as "private international law."
Economics is a public policy science that, in its normative form,
evaluates the design of institutions for the organization of
economic activity.' This perspective recognizes that the realm of
business - the so-called "free" market and its main denizen, the
firm - is a social construct susceptible to this evaluation and
compatible with this design. The use of the term "economics"
recognizes the contingency of business and recognizes that the
inclusion of markets and firms is a question of institutional design
rather than a fact of nature. We must decide continually, as a
national or as an international society, where this design fulfills
our needs better than others.
Second, partially as a corollary to the first point, I note the
emptiness of the category "private international law." Private
international law is not separate from public international law.
As many realists and critical legal theorists long ago pointed out,
"private law" is an oxymoron. Rather, the important underlying
issue is that there are at least two kinds of persons subject to law:
private persons and states. The two types of applicable law may
be quite different.
The third point follows from the second. That is, the very
term "international law" must be revisited and reevaluated, as the
1 I refer here to a more institutional form of economics. Most economists
today focus only on the market, and pay little regard to its legal and
institutional underpinnings. "They have become preoccupied with predicting
the effects of exogenous changes on the observable and measurable aspects of
market outcomes (price, wage rates, quantities, etc.) and with elaborating the
logical implications of alternative assumptions (or alternative 'models')."
GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLTICAL ECONOMY x (1985).
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system of law that governs international relations has both states
and individuals as its subjects and objects.2 Increasingly, "interna-
tional law" is taken to mean "transnational law," the term coined
by Philip Jessup, the late judge of the International Court of
Justice, to include in the scope of study private law and other
municipal law that affects relations between different countries
and their peoples.3 This is the integrated body of domestic and
international law that regulates both private persons and states,
competition in both the market for private goods and the market
for public goods. Regulation of competition in the market for
public goods naturally has an effect in the market for private
goods. As long as international law and transnational law are
taken to mean the same thing, there is no need to change the
name of this journal again, to refer to "transnational law." No
one would argue, however, that the subject matter of this journal
should be limited to treaties and customary international law, or
law between states. Rather, it should include outward- and
inward-regarding domestic law because this domestic law affects
relations between different countries and between people in
different countries. Whether to choose domestic or international
law to respond to particular issues is again a choice of institutional
design. Do we achieve more by cooperating, and if so, how can
we cooperate best?
Fourth, I note that international economic law and public
international law are not separate categories; 4 rather, international
2 See generally Mark W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law,
17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 61 (1984).
3 See PHILP C. JEssuP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (1956); see also HENRY
STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (1994). Alternative
terms include "law of nations," as proposed by Mark W. Janis, International
Law?, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 363, 371 (1991), and "world law," as proposed by
Harold Berman, The Role of International Law in the Twentyfirst Century:
World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1617, 1617 (1995). I believe that
"international law" will continue to undergo a change in meaning that will
make it equivalent to, or inclusive of, these other concepts. The word
"international," as originally coined by Bentham, describes fewer and fewer real
world circumstances, and is increasingly used to connote much more than
"inter-national" relations. See Mark W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the
Fashioning of "International Law," 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 405-18 (1984). It will
thus prove durable.
4 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, International Economic Law: Reflections on the
"Boilerroom" of International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 595, 596
(1995) (speculating that as much as 90% of public international law is
international economic law).
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economic law simply refers to a type of "public" international law
that has economic goals.' In fact, economic integration is the
leading motivation for new public international law today, and
the most fertile source of new legislation and constitutionalization
in international law. International economic law comprises a new
or expanded set of legislative fields for international law to
address. Indeed, international economic law is the leading engine
for revising the domaine reserve of traditional public international
law, the unquestioned margin of deference accorded the state.
Perhaps most importantly, international economic law provides
the functional basis for a new era of international
constitutionalization. 6  In this regard, traditional public interna-
tional law serves as the default constitutional structure on which
we build through constitution-like treaties.7  International
economic goals motivate positive legislation of constitutional and
legislative rules. In addition, there may be a spillover effect from
the economic to the political; this was a conscious strategy of Jean
Monnet and Robert Schuman in designing the European Econom-
ic Community.
I refer to the opening of this new era of international
legislation and constitutionalization as the "international economic
law revolution." This revolution allows us to see our world as a
s In fact, while it is not necessary to my argument, this argument may be
extended to hold that economics also dominates politics: Politics is one
category of institutional technique for social decisionmaking, and economics
includes both this category and, for example, the categories tat we have come
to speak of as the market and as the firm. The public choice technique of
applying economic analysis to political issues is based on this proposition. For
a discussion of the application of public choice theory to international
economic law, see Paul B. Stephan I, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice
Theor and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745
(1995).
6 For a chronicle of the constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome, see
Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
There is, of course, a relationship between the scope of subject matter addressed
at the international level and the institutions provided to address it, as described
by Weiler. John Jackson has called for further study of the "constitutional"
underpinnings of international economic law. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 606.
' By "constitution-like treaties," I mean treaties that establish bases for
further legislation and adjudication. These are treaties that do more than
simply create substantive rules for application, but create a method, beyond
mere intergovernmentalism, for creating further substantive rules either through
legislation of adjudication. The example par excellence is the Treaty of Rome,
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 87. See generally Weiler, supra note 6.
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single system, both geographically and functionally. If the law is
a seamless web, we must recognize and manage the complex and
subtle relationships between different countries' laws, and between
different areas of public policy, such as trade and the environ-
ment. Because decisions taken by people in one country affect
people in other countries, and decisions taken in one functional
area affect policy in other functional areas, we must determine to
what extent and how policy formation processes can be integrated.
This new era is revolutionary because it changes the underly-
ing assumptions of international law regarding the domaine reserve;
regarding the need for, possibilities for, and structure of interna-
tional legislation; regarding the role of international adjudication;
and regarding an international legal "constitution." It is revolu-
tionary because it has revealed the contingency of our public
international law institutions. After germinating in the European
Economic Community, the revolution has spread as the European
Union spreads and as its principles of free trade and
multilateralism are adopted in other regions and in the multilateral
system.8 The revolution in international law recognizes a greatly
increased scope of possible institutions from which to choose in
organizing international society.
2. INTERNATIONAL BusINEsS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONoMIc LAW
Economics is often associated with the allocation of social
capital through markets. While economics usually is defined as
the study of market-based activity, it increasingly has turned its
attention and analytical techniques to spheres not typically
considered to be markets, such as marriage, child-rearing,9 and
crime. As the domain of economics is expanded to encompass
nonmarket forms of economic organization, such as the family,
firm, or state as units of organization, economics emerges as a
broad science of choice of organizational form, a leading example
of which is the market itself. What, then, is business? Perhaps
business is the pragmatic implementation of this science of choice
' But see David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L.
1 (1994) (describing a critique of the European Union).
9 See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR
(1976); see also Jack Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 53 (1985).
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to exploit markets. Business includes sales, marketing, accounting
and human relations, topics conventionally excluded from
economics.1" The perspective of economics is often that of the
government, which is assumed to act as optimizer for the
aggregate of society rather than for the individual or firm.
Business analysis, on the other hand, often takes the perspective
of the individual or firm. Neoclassical economics has been
criticized by the new institutional economics for failing to
encompass this perspective and use it to inform its analysis."
A related purported distinction between international business
law and international economic law is the distinction between
transactions and trade. Transactions, in this sense, are between
private persons (or public persons treated more or less as private
persons), while trade is a matter of public policy and mercantilism
or protectionism. The distinction is one between levels of
analysis. Analysis at the individual or firm level of economic
organization is transactional, while analysis at the state or higher
level is economic. Because the substantive body of law governing
the individual is still predominantly domestic, this distinction
implicates the domestic-international dichotomy. A series of
related diads might thus include: (i) business: economics, (ii)
transactions: trade, (iii) domestic: international, and, as more
fully set forth below, (iv) private: public. A final diad that is also
related, although less clearly and more contentiously, is (v) rule-
oriented: power-oriented.
None of these diads is a dichotomy. From a curricular
10 On the other hand, all of these business activities play an important
microeconomic role. For example, an economics analysis of transaction costs
might find that marketing plays an important role in reducing the transaction
costs of obtaining information regarding products or services, and that
accounting facilitates analysis and communication both within and without the
firm.
11 This criticism has been made by the so-called new institutional
economics. See generally THRAIN EGGERTSSON, EcoNOMIc BEHAvIOR AND
INSTITUTIONS: PRiNCIPLES OF NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1990);
Bruno S. Frey, Institutions Matter: The Comparative Analysis of Institutions, 34
EUR. ECON. REV. 443 (1990); Steven G. Medema, Discourse and the Institutional
Approach to Law and Economics, 2 J. ECON. ISSUES 417 (1989); Douglass C.
North, Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth, 25 ECON. INQUIRY
419 (1987); Douglass North, The New Institutional Economics, 142 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 230 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The New Institutional
Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 73
(1993); Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis
of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 219 (1994).
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standpoint, a course in "international business transactions"
involves sales of goods, licensing of intellectual property, and
foreign direct investment, but might not include an investigation
of the legality (as opposed to the simple application) of tariff and
nontariff barriers that affect these transactions. From a pragmatic
business standpoint, however, as well as from the standpoint of
economic theory, these issues are inseparable.1 2 They are made
inseparable because of the interdependence between domestic law
and international law. Thus, the business person may use
international law as a basis to attack adverse domestic law.
International law may or may not be directly applicable to require
the nonapplication of inconsistent domestic law. Even if it is not
applicable by courts, it may form the basis for a favorable
interpretation of domestic law, or for a political attack on an
adverse domestic law.
Sales cannot be made without considering tariff and nontariff
barriers to export transactions and their international legality.
Intellectual property cannot be licensed without considering local
laws protecting intellectual property, which have been recognized
in the Uruguay Round to be importantly related to trade, and
which are disciplined under the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Good ("TRIPs"). Foreign investment decisions cannot
be made separately from issues of tariffs, antidumping duties, and
rules of origin, and from issues of protection against mistreatment
that may be possible, for example, under bilateral investment
treaties. Of course, from a pedagogical standpoint, it may make
sense to separate the contract, commercial law, conflict of laws,
and other private dispute resolution issues, which share some
common themes, from trade law issues, which relate more to
competition, especially competition among states, as opposed to
private persons. From a practical and theoretical standpoint,
however, it must be recognized that transactions and trade are
inseparable.
Finally, the distinction between business and economics,
between international business law and international economic
12 See Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law
Issue: The Economics of Private International Law, in ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ([agdeep Bhandari & Alan Sykes eds., forthcoming
1996).
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law, may be viewed as a distinction between private and public.
3. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PpivATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
All law is public.13 While the type of law called private law
regulates relationships between private persons, it has a public
purpose and is constructed therefor: "There was nothing natural
about laissez-faire."1 4 If there is no private law, there can be no
private international law. The topic of private international law
traditionally encompasses the range of legal issues arising from the
fact that private relations cross jurisdictional boundaries, and
different jurisdictions implicate different legal systems. The topic
of "conflict of laws" includes such issues within a divided domestic
system, as well as private international law in the international
system." The central issue in conflict of laws and within private
international law, however, is a fundamental issue of state
authority; namely, which state will be allocated the legal power
to regulate the matter? The proposition that all law is public
indicates that all conflict of laws issues are issues of allocation of
public power. 6  The question of allocation of public power is
also the fundamental question of public international law. It
13 This insight has been attributed to Lenin. For further discussion of the
distinction between public and private law, see JOHN HAZARD, COMMUNISTS
AND THEIR LAW 77 (1969); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the
Public Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267 (1986);
Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward A Critical Jurisprudence - A First Step by Way
of the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379
(1983); Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in
American Law andLife, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237 (1987); Morton S. Horwitz, The
History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982);
Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); L. Harold Levinson, The Public Law/Private Law
Distinction in the Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1579 (1989); John H.
Merryman, The Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and American
Law, 17 J. PUBLIc L. 3, 13 (1968); Roscoe Pound, Public Law and Private Law,
24 CORNELL L. Q. 469 (1939); John R. Stevenson, The Relationship of Private
International Law to Public International Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1952).
14 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 139 (1944).
11 See, e.g., Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in
Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1966) (exploring the
differences in policy between interstate and international conflict of law cases).
16 This proposition is not new, although it is not universally accepted.
William Baxter said of Brainerd Currie: [a]s his own analysis effectively
shows, the process of resolving choice cases is necessarily one of allocating
spheres of legal control among states." William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and
the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1963).
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arises whether we are speaking of legislative jurisdiction, adjudica-
tive jurisdiction, or jurisdiction to enforce. It is a question of
horizontal and vertical intergovernmental relations.
Thus, private international law is not so much isolated from
as it is absorbed by public international law. 17 The problem
with this absorption is a problem with public international law's
arid failure to address the public policy issues implicated in the
claims and interests of private persons. 8 This failure has been
rooted in the absence of a mechanism for active legislation and the
incorporation of democratic values in legislation in the interna-
tional legal sphere. As noted below, the international economic
law revolution is rapidly revealing the need for mechanisms for
active legislation and the incorporation of appropriate democratic
values which must precede such legislation. Perhaps the failure is
more deeply rooted in the absence of a strong motivation for
public international legislation, other than in limited areas such as
the laws of war. While we rightly bemoan human rights
violations and failures of democratic politics in other countries,
we are unable to accept reciprocal incursions on our own
autonomy. In the low politics of trade and business regulation,
restrictions on autonomy, or sovereignty, often seem less threaten-
ing.
While the distinction between private and public may bear
little weight, there is another distinction implicit in the separation
of private international law from public international law. The
latter distinction relates to the persons who are subjects and
objects of the law, and to the direct effect of the law on private
persons.19 In this sense, private international law governs the
17 See Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 149, 152 (1988). Paul recognizes the inseparability of private international
law and public international law. He criticizes the isolation of private
international law from public policy concerns, a criticism echoed by the current
author. See id. at 171.
1" See generally Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A
Modest Proposal, 100 YALE LJ. 2277 (1991).
19 See generally NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONs AND INTERNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC LAW (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993); UNITED
KINGDOM NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF COMPARATIVE LAW, THE EFFECT OF
TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987);
Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration Mechanisms in the Law of the United
States: Starting Over, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 155 (1993); John H.
Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 310 (1992).
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relations of private persons in connection with property, con-
tracts, civil wrongs, and a host of other issues in which private
persons relate directly to one another. Governments increasingly
recognize, however, that private relationships are public policy
issues and, on the international plane, espouse in one form or
another the claims or interests of private persons. They also
engage in efforts to unify or otherwise organize the world of
"private law" in order to facilitate business. They often do so
through public international law techniques, including entry into
treaties. Of course, private persons may have obligations as well
as rights. Rights or obligations may arise either directly by virtue
of the treaty or customary international law, or indirectly by an
act of transformation.
The question of whether a particular international legal rule
binds and benefits only the state or also binds and benefits private
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the state (where it is not
determined by national constitution) is first a question of intent
as expressed in the legal rule: did the legislature intend to affect
the rights or duties of private persons? The policy bases for doing
so may vary in different contexts, 0 but a central issue in this
question of direct effect, or of self-executing nature, is the issue of
integrity and uniformity of implementation. It is an issue of the
bindingness of the international legal rule.
International economic lawyers know, perhaps better than
public international lawyers and critics of public international law,
that absolute binding power is not always good for a legal system
and that rigidity can equal brittleness while flexibility may add
durability" Insufficient binding power may raise significant
problems, however, including the risk of defection. The risk of
defection may deter agreement in the first place, or may precipi-
tate pre-emptive defection or inappropriate unilateral action to
address alleged defection.
Thus, to the extent that private international law has been the
20 See Brilmayer, supra note 18.
21 "Seithenyn rejects the criticism that there are weak spots in his seawall,
saying: 'That is the beauty of it. Some parts of it are rotten and some parts
of it are sound.... If it were all sound it would break by its own obstinate
stiffness: the soundness is checked by the rottenness, and the stiffness is
balanced by the elasticity.'" THOMAS LOVE PEACOCK, THE MISFORTUNES OF
ELPHIN AND RHODODAPHNE 13 (1897), quoted in William Diebold, From the
ITO to GATT - and Back? (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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type of international law enforced without question by domestic
courts backed by the full authority of the state, we might say that
it has been the more serious brand of international law, the one
skeptics cannot question. This strength of private international
law has been derived from the institutional support provided to
private international law due to its status, generally, as domestic
law. I argue below that support from legislative and adjudicative
institutions is critical to the international economic law revolu-
tion.22
There is no natural condition for law; different levels of
binding power are appropriate in different circumstances.'
While there is great descriptive utility to John Jackson's "power-
oriented" versus "rule-oriented" dichotomy,24 a post-modernist
might argue that this dichotomy is normatively indeterminate.
The flow of human history is not uni-directional toward strongly
enforceable legal rules. Rather, we use rules of different binding
force for different reasons at different times. In fact, a Marxist
and a Chicago School adherent might agree that law should wither
away as either socialism develops or transaction costs are reduced,
respectively. If this were true, one might expect legal rules to
become less binding over time. On the other hand, there is
growth. It comes in the form of an expanded range of options,
from less binding force to greater binding force. As more rule-
oriented institutions become available, they seem useful to address
some problems and are in fact used. There remain, however,
circumstances that seem to call for reduced binding force.
2 Of course, one weakness of private international law has been its
disunity: If the legislatures and courts of each state apply their own private
international law, each state's private international law will be different, with
possibilities for excessive research and compliance costs, and with possibilities
or inappropriate externalization through law that operates to the disadvantage
of foreign persons.
23 But see Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease
of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 (1983).
24 See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 85-88
(1989); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution:
Building a Private-Interests System offustice, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 111 (1992);
Kenneth W. Abbott, GA 7T as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and
Beyond, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31 (1992); Phillip R. Trimble, International
Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1985).
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4. THE COMPLEXITY OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW:
COMPARATIVE LAW, INTER-DOMESTIC LAW, CONFLICTS OF
LAW, AND TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Coinciding with the disappearance of private international law
and its absence from most law school curricula has been the rise
of the subject of international business law, often taught in a
course entitled "international business transactions," but some-
times taught in a course entitled "international trade law." This
subject has little conventional theoretical coherence, but represents
a range of subjects that arise in connection with international
business. At the core of this subject is conflicts of law in the
international setting: private international law as it pertains to
business issues. International business transactions also includes,
however, certain outward-regarding domestic law, such as the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act15 and the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act,26 or regulation of incoming foreign direct invest-
ment or of licensing of "foreign" intellectual property. Of course,
the principal component of "international" business law is simply
comparative law, in a broad sense, dealing with the application of
inward-regarding domestic law to international business. From a
business standpoint, comparative law inquires what the legal and
regulatory environment will be in a foreign country. How will
differences affect investment decisions and business strategy? This
comparative exercise includes virtually all areas of business law
and regulation, from contract law to labor law and tax.
In addition to this "inter-domestic" law, there is a small corpus
of public international law that regulates or affects international
business transactions. This includes certain treaties, such as the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods' and the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 28 There is little in the
way of traditionally conceived customary international law that
25 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-ff (1988).
26 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602-11 (1992).
27 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, 19 I.L.M. 668 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1988).
21 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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regulates relations among private persons, but the lex mercatoria2
may be viewed as a body of customary law applied by states and
arbitral tribunals to relations among private persons, in some
cases.
International business law, like private international law, thus
may be viewed as substantially composed of domestic law,
including domestic conflict of laws rules. This does not reduce its
character as law, nor does it reduce its influence over international
business relations. This body of transnational law merits serious
study in at least three contexts. Each of these contexts may be
addressed from either a private business policy perspective or from
a public policy perspective.
First, it is necessary simply to describe differences in law.
From a business or "private policy" standpoint, this represents the
means of assessing the legal and regulatory environment. From
a more analytical public policy standpoint, this comparative
exercise can inform public policy: why do they do it differently
there, and how do the differences inform our local public policy?
In addition, from a public policy perspective, differences in rules
may hinder international commerce without good cause.
Second, given differences in rules, overlaps or underlaps in the
application of rules may represent either opportunities or
problems from a private policy perspective. From a business
perspective, for example, the problem of double taxation is only
ameliorated by the possibility of designing structures that result
in taxation by no government. From a public policy perspective,
underlaps in rules may create gaps in regulation which eviscerate
the regulation. Overlaps in rules may unjustifiably hinder interna-
tional commerce.
Third, domestic rules may confer competitive advantages or
disadvantages on firms that are subject to them, and these
advantages may be a basis for firms to engage in regulatory
arbitrage (private policy) and for states to engage in regulatory
29 See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J. INT'L DiSP. RESOL. 235 (1988);
Harold J. Berman & Felix J. Dasser, The "New" Law Merchant and the "Ole:
Sources, Content and Legitimacy, in LEx MERCATORIA AND ARBiTRATION -
A DIscussIoN OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 21-36 (Thomas E. Carbonneau
ed., 1990).
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competition (public policy)." Regulatory arbitrage accentuates
the rewards of regulatory competition.
For these reasons, international business law merits serious
study both from private and public policy perspectives. As a
matter of public policy, it merits serious study as a branch of
international economic public policy, or international economic
law. Increasingly, it is recognized that domestic regulation of
business is within the domain of international economic law.
International economic law addresses some of these concerns by
promoting cooperation among states and limiting competition. In
order to achieve these goals, states may agree on:
* rules of jurisdiction,
* rules of treatment such as national treatment or most
favored nation treatment,
* rules of proportionality of national law,
* rules of (sometimes mutual) recognition of foreign
regulation,
* harmonization of law, or
" institutions that will, legislatively or adjudicatively,
effect these tasks in the future.3'
States need motivations to make these types of agreements.
Motivations may include reduction of regulatory barriers to trade,
avoidance of adverse externalization, greater efficiency in the
application of regulation, and limitation of competition in
regulation (avoidance of a "race to the bottom"). All of these
motivations arise from cross-border economic activity, or trade.
5. THE FUNCTIONAL ALLURE OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW
International economic law is most visible in the European
Union and in the GATT/WTO systems, although it is growing
in other regional organizations and in multilateral or plurilateral
30 See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition,
Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993).
31 See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services under GA TS
NAFTA and the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 37 (1996).
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organizations with sectoral responsibilities. The European
Union's design and history have been marked by a functionalist
approach. This functionalism asks: what do we need to do today,
and how will we do it? It purports to eschew idealism -
including one-worldism or world federalism - rolls up its sleeves,
and sets about pragmatic tasks to address concrete, mostly
economic, needs. This functionalism in the European Union and
in the GATT/WTO system is aligned with the cosmopolitan
perspective described by David Kennedy as exemplified by the
work of John Jackson: pragmatic, modest and shy of its own
idealism.32  This cosmopolitan perspective is contrasted by
Kennedy with the "metropolitan" perspective of Hans Kelsen: also
pragmatic, but building idealistic public international law "arks"
without relation to specific needs on the ground.33
5.1. The Constitutional Function of Public International Law
The Peace of Westphalia34 crytallized a limited and rigid set
of possibilities for international institutional design. The so-called
Westphalian system served as the basis for an international law of
"rugged individualist" states, neither pooling sovereignty nor, in
theory, making incursions on the sovereignty of states. The
substantive rules of this international law were dependent upon
individual consent by states,3" and hostile to derogations of
sovereignty, construing them narrowly wherever purported to be
made. Although the Westphalian system accepts treaty rules and
customary rules, it has been reluctant to accept more organic
types of institutions that would have the capacity to make rules
without consent. Indeed, there has been and still is significant
political opposition to derogation of sovereignty along these
lines.36
Generally, the Westphalian system provided limited options
32 See David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 7, 10.
33 See id. at 103.
See generally Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J.
INT'L L. 20 (1948).
" See S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.Ij. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
36 See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE:
GATT, NAFTA AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER (1993);
Joel P. Trachtman, Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power and
Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. Lj. 399 (1994).
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for institutionalization of international relations. There are two
poles of institutionalization, intergovernmentalism and integration.
Intergovernmentalism is simply a method of facilitating action by
member states without binding them in advance to accept action.
It provides a forum, an agenda, and perhaps a secretariat to
support and precipitate action. It does not represent a transfer of
binding decisionmaking power, although every bureaucrat knows
that transferring this type of power can increase productivity.
Integration, on the other hand, involves a pooling of
decisionmaking power, or sovereignty. In institutional economics
terms, intergovernmentalism is facilitation of the market of
international relations, while integration is the creation of a
"firm." These are different in degree, not in kind, but the
differences are significant. With integration, decisive power is
pooled or otherwise transferred and a governance mechanism is
established to wield the decisive power. Obviously, integration
may be deemed appropriate for some issues and not for others,
and, as noted above, the scope of subject matter over which power
is shared will be determined by, and will determine, the type of
governance structure deemed appropriate.
Until relatively recently, the Westphalian system concerned
itself largely with issues of war and peace - international
political law as opposed to international economic law. These
issues have seemed less conducive to integration than the low
politics of international economic law, although the demonstra-
tion effect and spillover from integration in the economic sphere
may advance integration in the field of high politics. As interna-
tional economic law issues increasingly arise to challenge the
Westphalian system, it is being transformed. Its basic concepts of
sovereignty, of domaine reserve, of sovereign equality, and of
territorial jurisdiction must be revised. This is the international
economic law revolution.
5.2. International Economic Law and International Economic
Integration
International economic law does not have a standard defini-
tion. Two leading scholars and practitioners, John Jackson and
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, provide the following definitions:
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Jackson:
This phrase can cover a very broad inventory of
subjects: embracing the law of economic transactions;
government regulation of economic matters; and
related legal relations including litigation and interna-
tional institutions for economic relations.
3
7
Petersmann:
[International economic law] presents itself as a con-
glomerate of private law (including 'law merchant' and
'transnational commercial law'), state law (including
'conflict of laws') and public international law (includ-
ing supranational integration law as in the EEC) with
a bewildering array of multilateral and bilateral treaties,
executive agreements, 'secondary law' enacted by
international organizations, 'gentlemen's agreements'
central bank arrangements, declarations of principles,
resolutions, recommendations, customary law, general
principles of law, de facto-orders, parliamentary acts,
governments decrees, judicial decisions, private con-
tracts or commercial usages.
38
In these definitions, we can discern the international business law
(including private international law)39 topics discussed above.
Also discernable is the public international law of multilateral and
17 Jackson, supra note 4, at 596.
a" Ernst- lrich Petersmann, International Economic Theoty and Internation-
al Economic Law. On the Tasks of a Legal Theory of International Economic
Order, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS
IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 227, 251 (R. St. J.
MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983); see also JACKSON, supra note
24, at 21-23.
" But see Georg Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of
International Economic Law, 1966 RECEUIL DES COURS D'ACADtMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] I 7-11 (1967) (providing a definition of
international economic law that excludes private law, but recognizing the
overlap between private international law and public international law).
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regional trade, or integration, which traditionally pertains to trade
in goods, but combines its trade concerns with the regulatory
concerns of international business law to attack other bulwarks of
the domaine reserve, such as intellectual property regulation,
competition law, investment law, environmental law, regulation
of services, labor law, and, eventually, all other areas of business
regulation. The international economic law system, however,
does not present a full set of rationales for these types of regula-
tion; the full set of rationales must first be articulated domesti-
cally.'
Competition among states, namely regulatory competition, is
a central rationale for bringing these types of regulations to the
international realm.4' The resulting international economic law
is fundamentally a law of competition which permits and forbids
certain competitive acts in international trade. Implicit in the idea
that this international economic law is a law of competition is the
notion that there is a market in which this competition takes
place. This is not the market among private producers of goods
and services, but the market among states for public goods. States
compete for jobs, wealth, and power, or rather, their governments
compete for reelection by reference to their ability to secure jobs,
wealth and power. The field regulated by international economic
law is at the center of this competition. When states decide to
regulate or restrain the competition, they cooperate to establish
international economic law among themselves.42
40 Rationales, or foals, very clearly follow the principle of subsidiarity.
They come from the owest possible level, from the individual level. From a
contractarian standpoint, each individual enters successively higher levels of
social organization to achieve his or her goals more effectively than is possible
alone, or at lower levels of organization. See, e.g., BRENNAN & BUCHANAN,
supra note 1, at 19-32. Again, no particular level seems presumptively to merit
responsibility, but as the scope of institutions available increases, a more
accurate allocation of responsibility becomes possible. While individuals may
have direct participation at different levels, e.g., citizens of Massachusetts
participate individually (the electoral college aside) in U.S. national elections,
they also may participate indirectly, e.g., national executives may determine
positions taken in international organizations. This is the structural explana-
tion of the "democracy deficit."
41 The other important reason for international regulatory cooperation is
international externalization, where adverse effects are imposed on citizens of
other states. See generally Trachtman, supra note 30 (discussing regulatory
competition and externalization among states).
42 This is no different from the story of the emergence of regulation in
domestic society: regulation emerges to limit competition, to say that there are
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This conception of international economic law presents a view
of the types of state actions that are permissible during competi-
tion. It prohibits many acts of protectionism and mercantilism.
Yet, we have learned recently that the domain of potential protec-
tionism and mercantilism is quite large. As tariff barriers and
nontariff barriers to trade in goods have been reduced, less
obvious differential applications of embedded legal and regulatory
law have been used to form nontariff barriers not only to trade in
goods, but to trade in services and investment. These nontariff
barriers, however, have a dual character that makes them difficult
to address. First, they are socially rooted, often democratically
legitimated, structures that represent a domestic vision of how
domestic society should be organized to achieve domestic values.
Second, they are international trade barriers. The transformed
perspective of international economic law, however, transcends
this artificial bifurcation.
The transformed perspective of international economic law
does not reject domestic values, it absorbs them. This trans-
formed perspective recognizes that just as we must "think globally
and act locally," we must also think locally and act globally.
Thus, domestic values can be maximized through international
action. In this sense, all politics is domestic, at least in its origins.
Increasingly often, however, it is necessary to enter the market of
international relations to maximize domestic values, such as
wealth, employment, and environmental protection. We may
take the example of environmental concerns. Sometimes the best
way to articulate environmental concerns and obtain a desired
outcome is purely through local politics, which may affect the
local environment or may be used to affect the global environ-
ment. At other times, it is more effective to engage in interna-
tional politics in order to affect either the local environment or
the global environment. From the private actor's perspective, the
question is one of strategy: how can I best achieve what I want?
From the public policy perspective, the question is one of
certain minimum standards of conduct. Sometimes regulation emerges to
require the internalization of externalities. Regulation also may arise, however,
to address pecuniary externalities: the harmful effects that may result from
market competition itself. While economists seem to believe that in the long
run, the benefits of international trade significantly outweigh the disruptions
it occasions, governments generally decline to conform their policy to this
theoretical insight.
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institutional design: how can local and global institutions be
designed to give people more of what they want? At least
initially, this public policy perspective is that of local government.
When local government recognizes that it can give people more
of what they want by entering the market of international
relations, presumably it will do so.
The problem of the relationship between trade and other
societal values43 may be referenced generically as the "trade
and . . ." problem. The "trade and. . ." problem is similar to the
tradeoff in domestic society between promoting allocation in the
market, and the other social goals such as environmental protec-
tion, labor rights, worker safety, and securities antifraud.
Consider further the example of environmental protection. In
domestic society, a stereotypical business asks that the market be
permitted to operate without environmental regulation, and a
stereotypical environmentalist asks that the environment be left
untouched. Both are wrong because society needs both a market
and an environment; the only question is how much of each.
44
This is the question implicit in one definition of the term
"sustainable development."
The conflict is replicated in international trade, with
GATT/WTO acting as defenders of the market and the environ-
mentalists playing their familiar role, globally instead of locally.
This image may remind us that we live in a global community
with roles both for the market and for environmental protec-
tion.4" Sometimes, the values they embody seem inconsistent
and we feel we are required to make a tradeoff between them.
This is a tradeoff, but not necessarily one between efficiency
and inefficiency. It is not even a tradeoff between production and
consumption, with market activity as the socially productive
component and regulation as social consumption. Rather, it is
first a tradeoff among the types of goods we want. Second, it is
"' See generally Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization and Social
Issues, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 17 (1994).
4 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATI, the ICJ &
Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043 (1994) (arguing that
institutions are needed that can address these issues in an integrated fashion).
41 "[I]t is no longer possible to treat ecology and [the] international political
economy as separate spheres." Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, The
International Politics of the Environment: An Introduction, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL PoLITics OF THE ENVIRONMENT 3 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict
Kingsbury eds., 1992).
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a basis for choosing among the types of institutions that can
maximize our basket of goods.
Although the market is capable of providing environmental
protection, labor rights, and benefits, most societies have implicit-
ly decided that they are dissatisfied with the market's ability to
provide these goods (there is no such thing as "market failure,"
only market relative inefficiency). A transaction costs analysis
would assume that transaction costs prevent the market from
providing the desired levels of these goods. In order to justify
regulation, it must go one step further. It must find that the
political process does a better job of producing the desired level of
these goods.
Let us continue with the example of environmental protection.
When we regulate, we decide implicitly through governmental
structures that the mix of environmental protection and other
goods provided by the market is insufficiently weighted in favor
of environmental protection. According to this model, regulation
is considered a more efficient way to get what people want
because politics is a more efficient form of social organization
than goods and services markets, for these purposes. This assumes
a political process that is perfectly reflective of people's goals.
Regulation is not, however, always the most efficient form of
organization. It sometimes provides less of what we want. This
might be termed "government failure," although this term should
be rejected for the same reason we reject "market failure."
Rather, this problem requires a comparative institutional analysis.
The efficient choice, or combination, of social organization
(including market organization) will be that which minimizes the
sum of two costs: (i) deadweight loss due to failure to provide the
optimal mix of environmental protection and other goods, and (ii)
transaction costs in arriving at the final allocation. Our existential
task, then, is to choose the least imperfect - the most efficient -
institutional structure to achieve our goals.46  We may mix
institutional structures if doing so provides the most efficient
means to achieve our goals.
46 The fact that we each have different goals presents some challenges to
this analysis. The challenge is met, however, in the same way that any social
contract is entered. Each decides to enter based on his or her own needs, and
the increased ability to satisfy them in society. Where action alone, or at a
lower level of social organization, can provide more, no rational decisionmaker
would choose to move to a higher level of social organization.
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Similarly, at the level of international society, the decisions of
individual states regarding environmental protection and other
social benefits are the decisions of the market. Free trade regimes
establish this market, but again, a market is not necessarily the
best method to obtain for people what they want. Cooperation
in the form of regulation of the way states regulate may be
necessary under certain circumstances. Sometimes, it is necessary
to discipline national regulation through regimes of nondiscrimi-
nation, or, more intrusively, through regimes of proportionality,
mutual recognition, or harmonization. These regimes may
involve harmonization down, but also may involve harmonization
up. Where they involve harmonization down, they are unlikely
to mandate reduction of regulation, but only to provide that
regulation at a higher level cannot be applied to foreign suppliers.
Again, the optimal choice of international organization, including
unregulated state autonomy, will be that which minimizes the
aforementioned sum of two costs, deadweight losses and transac-
tion costs.
The main distinction between the "trade and. .. " problem in
international society and the market versus regulation problem in
domestic society is one of institutional capacity and institutional
choice. Within domestic society, we have market, legislative,
regulatory, and judicial mechanisms that can make the tradeoff
between, for example, environmental goods and other goods. We
may differ on which institution can best formulate individual deci-
sions.47 If we determine that the market is not the appropriate
mechanism, however, we may use a governmental institution to
make the tradeoff.
In comparison, consider the international economic order, and
the case of the GATT tuna panel in particular.48 The GATT
tuna case, the notorious first clash of environmental values with
trade values, occurred when the United States enforced the Marine
Mammals Protection Act49 and imposed an embargo on certain
tuna from a number of countries, including Mexico. While the
"' For the leading legal work on comparative institutional analysis, see
generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994).
41 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report
on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991); see
also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
49 See 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1988).
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reasons why the GATT dispute resolution panel held that the
United States had violated GATT have been analyzed closely
elsewhere and cannot be recounted here,50 it is worth noting that
the environmental community was furious with the decision. In
their view, GATT had embarked on an attack on environmental
protection. GATT was merely ignorant of environmental
considerations, however, and the unfortunate dispute resolution
panel had little choice but to apply the GATT law as they saw it.
There were several reasons for GATT's pre-1991 ignorance of
the environment. First, GATT had no environmental brief.
When GATT was established in 1947, protection of the environ-
ment was not such a large concern and the relationships between
trade and the environment were not recognized. Second, GATT
had little in the way of legislative capacity. It could not itself
make new rules regarding the tradeoff between the environment
and the market.51 Third, GATT's dispute resolution procedures
did not provide opportunities for the submission of amicus briefs
or other input from nongovernmental organizations that domestic
courts in the United States allow. These three failures added up
to a single problem, the failure to link different issues that were
important to people and to make tradeoffs between them.
Additionally, there was a failure to have institutions that can
efficiently make these tradeoffs.
6. SPILLOVER INTO CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS:
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION
As states cooperate more densely, they may find it worthwhile
to create institutions to facilitate or enhance cooperation. By
institutions, I mean any device that constrains future choice, that
constrains some component of politics over some period of time,
including rules that have some binding effect, and including
formal institutions such as the WTO, the European Union, and
their legislative, judicial, and executive components.
These institutions can be explained in transaction cost terms,
and in related game theoretic terms. The transaction cost
5' See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, United States - Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1992).
" While it was technically possible for GATT to do so through its waiver
or decision process, these were not viewed as politically viable.
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explanation of institutions is based on Coase's transaction cost
explanation of firms,52 which argues that institutions are created
because they allow efficient transactions to take place at a lower
transaction cost than if the transactions took place in the market.
In the context of international economic organizations, states
would presumably be better off if they could agree not to engage
in certain categories of protectionist or mercantilist behavior, or
if they could coordinate their business regulation in particular
ways. They might not agree to do so, however, for a number of
reasons. Perhaps they do not have effective means of communica-
tion, they lack means to monitor one another's conduct, or they
have inadequate means to enforce an agreement. These problems
may be described in transaction cost terms, i.e. it is too expensive
to communicate with, monitor, and enforce an agreement.
Assuming these problems, the international trade context may be
modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. The solution to the prisoner's
dilemma is to establish means to communicate with the other
player and to bind and monitor the other player's behavior. Of
course, these solutions can be used only to the extent that they are
less costly than the loss from failure to agree and less costly than
"market"-type solutions to the same problems (by "market"-type,
I mean transactions effected without institutions).
As more subject matter is addressed in international contexts,
it may be more appropriate to establish international institutions
to facilitate agreement and maximize the benefits of agreement.
While extensive institutionalization might not be efficient in a
single functional area such as securities regulation, 53 as the
number of functional areas is multiplied to include all services, or
an even wider area including goods, services, and intellectual
property, it may well be more efficient to create institutions.
Furthermore, the inclusion of multiple areas in common institu-
tions may provide benefits in terms of the ability to exchange, and
the ability to require compensation for breach, as well as econo-
mies of scale and economies of scope.
As the GATT tuna case illustrates, it is necessary to recognize
52 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937),
reprinted in RONALD COASE, THE Filvm, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988).
11 See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism,
Multilateralism and Functionalism: A Comparison with Reference to Securities
Regulation, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1994) (discussing the
institutional aspects of international cooperation in securities regulation).
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the linkage among various issues, and to make any tradeoffs in a
conscious and legitimate manner. As more issues that were
previously part of the domaine reserve are addressed in the
international sphere, international institutions will be required to
replicate some of the functions otherwise performed by domestic
institutions. These functions include, most importantly, sensitivi-
ty to the wide range of social issues that need to be integrated in
any decision. The international sphere heretofore had the luxury
of engaging in single-issue analysis. It has not needed to engage in
significant tradeoffs among social issues, especially where the issues
were part of domestic jurisdiction. Increasingly, we recognize that
the world is interconnected not only geographically, but also
functionally. Thus, it has become necessary for institutions -
judicial, legislative, and executive - to be able to address issues
such as trade and the environment in an integrated fashion.'
No society can afford to make decisions in an unintegrated
fashion.
Legislative institutions raise the greatest issues of sovereignty
and democracy. International legislation will be viewed as lacking
sufficient legitimacy until it can be said to be sufficiently demo-
cratically produced. In reality, however, the democracy deficit is
a deficit of direct democracy, assuming that the executives of
member states are democratically elected.
On the other hand, each "trade and . . ." problem may be
viewed as a legislative problem requiring legislative institutions to
address it. Of course, it might be decided that international
cooperation in the particular subject area is not worthwhile, that
competition is more valuable than cooperation in that area, or
that the costs of cooperation are too high. It may still be
appropriate, however, to create legislative institutions to make this
"subsidiarity" or "level of governance" decision. (This assumes a
decision to allocate the competence - competence decision to the
international body, a decision which itself may warrant significant
analysis.) If substantive legislation at the international level is
valuable, legislative institutions are needed to produce the
legislation.
As noted above, the design of legislative institutions will be
14 The choice among these types of institutions is an important comparative
institutional analysis question. See generally KoMESAR, supra note 47
(explaining comparative institutional analysis in this context).
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interdependent with the scope of competence accorded the
legislative institution. With limited competence, more integration
may be more easily accepted because sovereignty may be relin-
quished in narrowly defined areas. With expanded competence,
national governments may determine to engage in more intergov-
ernmental types of institutionalization and avoid relinquishing a
veto over decisions.
Judicial institutions address the risks of auto-interpretation,
determining the facts, and the application of law to facts, thus
diminishing the possibility of defection through inappropriate
interpretation of the agreement. They thereby make agreements
more binding and, therefore, more attractive. Of course, strong
judicial institutions raise concerns of sovereignty, especially where
adjudication may be difficult to distinguish from legislation. As
noted above, they also may raise concerns that the law has grown
too strong, too brittle, and that it has overwhelmed and frozen
the political process.
A related type of institutionalization does not involve the
creation of organs, but relates to the relationship of rules created
by international institutions to rules created by states. I refer to
emblems of constitutionalization such as supremacy, preemption,
direct effect, and judicial review. This essay cannot address these
features in detail, but it is important to note that these features
determine the binding character and uniformity of international
law, and are an important feature in the design of international
institutions.
7. MANAGING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONoMIC LAW
REVOLUTION: ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AND REDISTRIUTIVE
CONCERNS
"Economic" motivations - motivations to maximize the
things we value - sometimes lead us to cooperate with each
other. This cooperation often will take legal or institutional
form. International economic law transcends international
business law and serves as the focal point for the construction of
the institutions which govern international society and interna-
tional law in general. The international economic law revolution
provides the basis for a new constitutional era in international
law. This is not an era for a single metropolitan ark,"5 but for
55 See Kennedy, supra note 32 and accompanying text, at 103.
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a cosmopolitan Dunkirk: a jury-rigged fleet comprising a wide
array of different forms of social organization, relating to one
another in various ways, both vertically and horizontally, and
adapting to new circumstances whenever appropriate.
The economic perspective is open to institutional competition
through experimentation and survival of the most efficient. While
a degree of institutional homogeneity, horizontal cooperation
among institutions, may be justified in order to promote commu-
nications and understanding among institutions, such homogeneity
must be weighed against the utility of diversity and competition.
The reader may be concerned that this essay's efficiency
perspective' does not respond to questions of redistributional
politics. Indeed, the politics of the new international economic
order, of explicit redistribution, have receded to cries of "trade not
aid."
Redistribution today can be effected on two bases, each fully
consistent with allocative efficiency. First, it can be effected in
the form of side payments to induce developing countries to
accept a higher standard of regulation than they might otherwise
accept. Greater opportunities for transactions (here not in goods
or services, but in public goods), due to greater scope of coverage,
may allow poorer countries the opportunity to realize the value
of their assets. For example, in the Uruguay Round of GATT,
developing countries were able to exchange greater protection for
intellectual property and greater access for foreign service
providers for greater access for textiles, agricultural products, and
tropical products. Free trade in public goods enhances values on
both sides and results in more efficient outcomes. These out-
comes include greater freedom of trade in goods and services.
This, too, should operate to the benefit of people in developing
countries, resulting in greater homogenization of incomes over
time.
Second, redistribution through institutional politics, based on
community, solidarity, or safe streets kinds of motivations can
take place in international society, albeit to a lesser extent than in
a domestic society." Perhaps this is natural. All politics is
relatively local, and solidarity and community do seem to dissipate
56 Even in domestic society, the political possibilities for redistribution may
be more limited than often imagined. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note
1, at 112-34.
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over geographic or cultural space. Neighbors seem to help
neighbors more than they help strangers, presumably for entirely
rational reasons relating to expectations of reciprocation. Part of
the project of the European Union, however, has been to try to
extend feelings of concern beyond the state to fellow Europeans:
converting strangers to neighbors. In fact, the analysis of this
essay would indicate that redistribution is simply another good.
Where a particular society wants more of it, it will vote for it.
There are many reasons for what we know as "alruism," but all
of them may be viewed, broadly, as enlightened self-interest.
8. SYNTHESIS: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
REVOLUTION
This essay began by showing the difficulties with and limita-
tions of the terms "private international law," "international
business law," and "public international law." These difficulties
and limitations are addressed by international economic law.
International economic law is the universal solvent, piercing and
transcending these traditional categories, and also piercing and
transcending some of the traditional constitutional underpinnings
of the international system.
The international economic law revolution described here is
most importantly a revolution in international law. It is a
transformation of society that draws from and contributes to
intensified relations among states, which in turn draws from and
contributes to increasing possibilities for institutionalization of
these relations (although the degree of institutionalization desirable
will vary). This process is driven by several facts. First, each
state's domestic legal system and regulatory structure has an
intended or unintended effect on each other state, either in terms
of externalities or in terms of competition. Every field of business
regulation is a trade issue, and trade is dependent on every other
area of business regulation. This fact is analogous to the fact in
domestic society that every field of business regulation affects the
market and the market is dependent on every area of public
policy. In domestic society, we have legislative, judicial, and
executive institutions to make decisions regarding how much
regulation we want, and how much market allocation we want.
In international society, these institutions are in a formative stage.
With the intensification of economic relations has come the
recognition that these relations can be facilitated, or made more
efficient, by increased regulatory transactions between states in the
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area of international trade law and business regulation. These
regulatory transactions take the form of agreements regarding
issues perceived as barriers to trade, including agreements
regarding regulatory jurisdiction, agreements regarding standards
for treatment of foreigners or their things, agreements for disci-
plining regulatory jurisdiction through rules of proportionality,
and agreements regarding harmonization of law. These regulatory
transactions can take place in the "market" for public goods,
where states enter into "spot" transactions for regulatory coopera-
tion. In addition, regulatory transactions may be facilitated by the
development of institutions. These institutions can allow greater
communications, a wider scope for exchange, increased binding
power, and greater possibilities for enforcement. They may
resolve the prisoner's dilemma often used to describe states in a
trading relationship. They are by no means always useful,
however; under many circumstances, the market of international
regulatory competition will provide us more of what we want.
Thus, despite the potential benefits of institutionalization, we
should not create international economic law and institutions
simply for the sake of building arks. We should not cooperate for
cooperation's sake. Rather, we should cooperate when coopera-
tion helps us to get more of what is good. 7
17 See, e.g., BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 1, at 6 ("[T]he rules that
constrain sociopolitical interactions - the economic and political relationships
among persons - must be evaluated ultimately in terms of their capacity to
promote the separate purposes of all persons in the polity.").
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